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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction exists over this case pursuant to UCA § 78-2-2(3)(j) and/or UCA § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). Appellant Ann V. Maak ("Maak" or "Mrs. Maak") appealed the 
determination of the trial court by filing her Notice of Appeal on February 8, 2006, which 
preserved her right of appellate review. (R. at 694-97.) 
ISSUE PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in determining that a patient was required to pay more 
money to the hospital after the patient's insurance company already had paid $986.63 
beyond what the hospital itself declared to be its final bill for all services rendered. 
Questions of statutory interpretation (particularly related to UCA § 26-21-20) are 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See, e.g., R.A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 100 P.3d 1159, 1161 (Utah 2004). 
Questions of contract interpretation (as relates to Maak's contracts with the hospital and 
with its insurer) are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
interpretation of contracts. See, e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am. Title 
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The appellant (plaintiff below), Ann Maak ("Maak"), commenced a lawsuit against 
the appellee (defendant below) Intermountain Health Care dba LDS Hospital ("IHC") in 
order to challenge IHC's billing procedures. Specifically, IHC issued to her a final bill 
for services in the amount of $986.63, despite the fact that Maak's insurer already had 
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paid IHC $914.25 more than the total billings IHC claimed were due and owing (Regence 
Blue Cross paid $12,310.36 and IHC itemized the total value of its services as being 
$11,396.11 in a statement sent to Maak in compliance with UCA § 26-21-20). IHC had 
not rendered any additional care or provided any additional service to justify the 
additional payment and indeed does not claim that it did so. 
Instead, IHC claims that Maak is required to pay $986.63 because of an agreement 
reached between it and Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah ("Regence") where 
compensation is based on Diagnostic Related Groups ("DRG"). DRG billing is a law-of-
averages compensation arrangement where all procedures or services of a certain kind are 
reimbursed by the insurer at the same level, regardless of actual costs for any one 
particular service or procedure (i.e., Regence will pay to IHC $12,310 for every surgical 
procedure of the kind performed on Maak). Maak does not contest the ability of IHC and 
Regence to agree to such a compensation arrangement, but she does contest the ability of 
these two entities to contractually enlarge her payment obligation to IHC. 
UCA § 26-21-20 is important to Maak's claim and an important aspect of this 
appeal. That statute states as follows: 
26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide state-
ments of itemized charges to patients 
(1) Each hospital . . . shall provide a statement of itemized charges to 
any patient receiving medical care or other services from that hospital. 
(2) The statement shall be provided to the patient or his personal 
representative or agent at the hospital's expense, personally, by mail, or by 
verifiable electronic delivery at the time any statement is provided to any 
person or entity for billing purposes. If the statement is not provided to a 
third party, it shall be provided to the patient as soon as possible and 
practicable. 
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(3) The statement shall itemize each of the charges actually provided 
by the hospital to the patient. 
As subparagraph 3 of this statute makes clear, the statement of itemized charges is 
required to account for all charges relative to services actually provided by the hospital. 
Maak asserts that intertwined with such an itemized statement of charges is the concept 
that once payment has been made in the total amount of the itemized entries contained on 
it, no further obligation is owed by the patient, regardless from whom the payments 
came. The necessary implication found in UCA § 26-21-20 that charges cannot exceed 
the amounts contained in the statement of services coincides with the only relevant 
contractual commitment made by Maak in this case, which was to ensure that IHC was 
paid the $11,396.11 it charges for services rendered to Maak. Once payment was made 
in that amount, from whatever source, Maak's obligations end contractually and by 
mandate of UCA § 26-21-20. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Maak filed her complaint on May 27, 2003 (R. at 1-24). As part of her complaint, 
she sought to represent a class of plaintiffs who similarly had been victimized by a billing 
procedure that seeks to collect more from patients after the patient's insurer already has 
paid an amount equal to or greater than what the health provider itself claims is owed (as 
contained in the itemized statement of charges issued in all such circumstances). IHC 
filed a third-party claim against Regence (R. at 69-83). Regence filed a motion to compel 
arbitration of the matter, based on language contained in its insurance agreement with 
Maak (R. at 95-159). Shortly after Regence sought to compel arbitration, IHC filed its 
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motion for summary judgment that eventually was granted by the trial court (R. 169-
255). Maak filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and also filed a claim under Rule 
56(f) for additional discovery on matters underlying IHC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, along with affidavits supporting her Rule 56(f) motion and opposing IHC's 
motion (R. at 256-358). The trial court heard oral argument on IHC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Regence's Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Maak's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at the same hearing on May 17, 2004. 
C. Disposition in Court Below 
In a Minute Entry dated June 21, 2004, the trial court granted IHC's motion, denied 
Maak's Rule 56(f) motion, and denied Regence's motion to compel arbitration as moot. 
As to Maak's Rule 56(f) motion, the court stated that "there is no need to delay these 
proceedings to engage in further discovery" (R. at 481). IHC's motion was granted 
because "[t]he billing plaintiff received from IHC above and beyond that amount paid by 
her insurance carrier . . . was all in accordance with the agreement that IHC had with 
Blue Cross Blue Shield, and the plaintiffs agreement that she would remain responsible 
for all co-insurance amounts. Clearly, her co-insurance obligation under her policy with 
Blue Cross Blue Shield was the 20% for which she is now being billed" (R. at 482). The 
court conceded that although it was "unusual for the hospital to be seeking payment 
above and beyond the amount that it billed, it is entitled to bill for the co-insurance 
amounts for which the plaintiff is responsible, even where that will result in an excess 
payment to the hospital" (R. at 482). The court declared that the circumstance "where 
her insurance carrier has paid the hospital in excess of what the hospital believes is due 
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for the services rendered to the plaintiff, is a situation that should be addressed between 
the plaintiff and her insurance carrier, not the plaintiff and the hospital" (R. at 482). 
A Memorandum Decision and Order was prepared by counsel for IHC and entered 
by the court on January 11, 2006. The Memorandum Decision states that the DRG-
based billing methodology in "rare instances . . . can result in the Participating Provider 
[here, LDS Hospital] receiving a dollar amount in excess of its itemized statement of 
services." The Memorandum Decision also states that IHC's billing was "consistent with 
the direction received from Regence" (R. at 688). The Memorandum Decision explained 
that the $11,396.11 amount contained on Maak's statement of services would serve as a 
cap on payments owed to IHC if Maak had paid for the services entirely out of her own 
pocket, but did not apply as a cap in this instance because of Maak's choice to submit a 
claim to her insurer, Regence, and because of the agreements between Regence and IHC 
and between Maak and both of these parties (R. at 689). The Memorandum Decision 
ultimately claimed that Maak's complaint concerning IHC's efforts to collect additional 
amounts from Maak (through threats from a collection agency and similar methods) was 
a concern she legally was required to raise with Regence, not IHC (R. at 690). 
D. Statement of Facts 
Facts relevant to the appeal include the following: 
1. Maak received emergency surgical treatment from LDS Hospital on April 2 
through April 5, 2002 (R. at 16-19). 
2. At the time of receiving treatment, Maak's husband signed a document labeled 
Consent and Conditions of Admission (R. at 194). 
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3. On April 29, 2002, IHC (the owner of LDS Hospital) sent Maak a statement 
itemizing the services for which she would be billed and containing the dollar value to be 
paid for each such service (R. at 16-19). 
4. The total dollar amount on the statement of services was $11,396.11 (R. at 
19). 
5. Shortly thereafter, IHC sent Maak a bill for services, demanding payment of 
$986.63 (R. at 21). No further services had been rendered by IHC between the time of 
sending the statement of itemized services and sending the bill for $986.63. 
6. IHC's bill for services started by listing the $11,396.11 contained on its 
itemized statement of charges, then listed three payments made by Regence Blue Cross, 
and then contained a fourth entry of $2,066.84 that was owed under the heading of 
"Regence Blue Cross" (R. at 21). 
7. After a series of correspondence between Maak's husband, Charles Maak (an 
attorney who practices in Salt Lake City and is of counsel with Maak's undersigned 
counsel), it became evident that the "$2,066.84" charged under the heading of "Regence 
Blue Cross" was an upward adjustment in the total bill based on DRG-based billing 
agreements between IHC and Regence. (R. at 23-24, 305-06, 311, 317). Stated 
differently, IHC and Regence had agreed that Regence would pay one amount for each 
classification of service provided, regardless of the actual cost or billing amount that IHC 
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incurred for the particular treatment at issue, and the billing statement was artificially 
adjusted to make the numbers jibe with the backdoor agreements.1 
8. IHC threatened to pursue collection of the $986.13 from Maak, despite having 
already been paid a total of $12,476.32 from Regence, and so Maak eventually was 
forced to pay the $986.13 amount under protest. (R. at 319-26). 
9. Maak filed her complaint against IHC shortly after paying the $986.13 under 
protest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court ruling eviscerated UCA § 26-21-20 and basic contract principles by 
determining that a hospital could require one of its patients to pay more money to it, 
despite having been overpaid by the patient's insurer the final amount the hospital itself 
claimed to be owing for all services performed. The error was reached by erroneously 
determining that the hospital's billing procedures - which sought payment after money 
had been received by the hospital beyond what the hospital itself claimed was owed -
were contractually agreed upon by Maak. In reality, the billing procedures the hospital 
employed were mandated by backdoor agreements reached between the hospital and the 
insurer, not by Maak. The hospital and the patient's insurer certainly are free to enter 
into creative reimbursement arrangements, but they cannot then enlarge the patient's 
obligation owed to the hospital by application of those agreements to which the patient is 
not a party. 
1
 The deceptive nature of this entry is at the core of Maak's final three claims asserted in her case. Each of these 
claims contains as a core element such deception, and the cryptic, inexplicable upward increase in the overall bill 
under an entry description of "Regence Blue Cross" satisfies the elements of these claims. 
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The decision below erred by concluding that Maak somehow had contractually 
acquiesced or agreed to the behind-the-scenes billing arrangements between the hospital 
and the insurer. Maak's husband signed a boilerplate admissions form with the hospital, 
but that document in no way discloses the billing arrangement between the hospital and 
the insurer, let alone constitute a consent by Maak to agree to pay the hospital beyond the 
value placed on such services by the hospital itself. In reality, the express language of the 
only contract Maak signed with IHC stated that her obligation to them consisted only of 
ensuring that they paid the dollar value of all actual services rendered, i.e., the $11,396.11 
they listed on the statement of itemized charges. 
Similarly, the insurance documents received by the patient from the insurer fail to 
disclose the behind-the-scenes agreements between the hospital and the insurer, let alone 
constitute a waiver of some sort for the patient to claim that it need not pay any additional 
amounts when the insurer already paid more than the full amount invoiced by the 
hospital. The closest the insurance agreement comes to addressing the issue is declaring 
that Regence may reimburse amounts that are greater or lesser than actual charges 
submitted by the hospital. That, however, is a far cry from communicating a contractual 
intent that a hospital be allowed to pursue further collections from a patient in a 
circumstance where the hospital already has received from the patient's insurer an 
amount that exceeds the total value of services performed. 
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ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment 
should be granted only if it is clear that a trial would be unnecessary and unjustified. See 
Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fideltiy & Guarantee Ins. Underwriters, 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). 
Generally, the non-moving party is entitled to have all facts presented or conceded and 
all reasonable inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in the light most favorable to 
them. See Lawrence Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); English v. 
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
I. The Trial Court Ruling Defies Contract Principles 
The ruling below misconstrues basic contract principles. The prima facie elements 
of a contract-based claim are: "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking 
recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Campbell 
Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 38 P.3d 984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Mrs. Maak's first 
and second claims for relief are based on a contract theory. The contract between Mrs. 
Maak and IHC was executed on the eve of her admission for health-care treatment - the 
Consent and Conditions of Admission dated April 2, 2002 (the "IHC/Maak Contract"). 
Paragraph "g" of the IHC/Maak Contract states the only relevant performance 
required of Mrs. Maak as follows under the heading of "financial responsibility": 
Patient and the undersigned, if other than the Patient, each jointly and 
severally agree to pay for all the health care services rendered to Patient 
in the Facility including but not limited to any amounts not paid by any 
insurance company or other third party payor. Patient and the 
undersigned, if other than the Patient, remains responsible for all co-
payments, deductibles, co-insurance, and/or non-covered services 
regardless of amount paid by insurance or third party payor. . . . 
(Emphasis added). The highlighted language represents the maximum extent to which 
IHC could expect payment from Mrs. Maak - only until "all the health care services 
rendered to Patient in the facility" were paid. IHC itself valued such amount at 
$11,396.11 in its statement of itemized charges. The moment it received payment, from 
any source, equal to $11,396.11, Maak had fulfilled her contract with IHC. See, e.g., 
Restatement, Second, Contracts § 235 ("Full performance of a duty under a contract 
discharges the duty."); Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 903 (Utah 2002) 
(summary judgment was proper in favor of party who had fully performed in accordance 
with the express contractual terms). IHC's efforts to collect more money from Maak 
after receiving full payment for services rendered constitutes breach of its contract with 
Maak and/or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and such 
breach has damaged Maak. 
II. The Trial Court Ruling Eviscerates UCA § 26-21-20 
The trial court ruling cannot be squared with a reasonable interpretation of UCA § 
26-21-20. IHC itself valued its total services at $11,396.11 in the itemized statement of 
charges it submitted. (R. at 183; IHC's memorandum at |^ 14 ("The Statement was 
provided in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-20, which requires each hospital 
to provide an itemized statement of charges to any patient receiving medical care.")). By 
holding as it did, the trial court effectively ruled that a hospital need not be required to 
adhere to the dollar amounts contained in the statement of itemized services required by 
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UCA § 26-21-20. All it need do instead is contract around this statutory requirement in 
back-door agreements with insurers. Such a result creates an absurdity disavowed in 
long-standing canons of contractual and statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Okelberry v. 
West Daniels Land Ass'n, 120 P. 34, 41, 2005 UT App. 327 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
(refusing to accept an interpretation that would create an absurd result). 
III. That Regence Paid IHC Is Legally Irrelevant 
The trial court also erred by accepting the argument that Maak's action of 
submitting payment of the hospital's charges to her insurer somehow removed the 
limitation that IHC be paid only the full amount of its services rendered, and nothing 
more. The fact that Mrs. Maak's obligations to pay for "all the health care services 
rendered' (i.e., $11,396.11) was satisfied by a third party - Regence - is legally 
irrelevant. See Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983) (under doctrine 
of executory accord, existing contract is satisfied by substituted performance by another 
in the future); Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982) 
(same). A health insurance contract, like Regence's here, does not designate coinsurance 
for the purpose of establishing the health-care charges owed to the health-care provider. 
Health insurance, by definition, is a 
contract or agreement whereby an insurer is obligated to pay or allow a 
benefit of pecuniary value with respect to the bodily injury, disablement, 
sickness, death by accident or accidental means of a human being, or 
because of any expense relating thereto, or because of any expense incurred 
in prevention of sickness, and includes every risk pertaining to any of the 
enumerated risks. 
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6tn Ed. 1979) at 804. In other words, a health insurance 
contract designates the circumstances and limitations upon which an insurer, like 
Regence, will pay for some or all of the charges owed to a health-care provider, like IHC, 
after the health-care provider sets those charges. Such charges are established without 
reference to whether insurance will pay some or all of the bill, and the insurance 
agreement between insurer and insured then establishes the amount of total charges that 
will be paid by insurer as a separate matter. Whatever amount of the health-care 
provider's charges are not paid by the insurer are left to be paid by the insured (and 
denominated coinsurance). If there is no insurance, the patient pays all of the provider's 
total charges. The insurer's contractual willingness to pay some of the charges at issue, 
although helpful in paying the bill owed to the provider, does not provide a right in that 
process for the health-care provider to unilaterally elevate its actual charges, nor does it 
give the health-care provider the ability to rely on any such attempted inflation of actual 
charges based on a behind-the-scenes agreement with that insurer. 
IV. IHC Is the Correct Defendant, not Regence 
The trial court also erred by accepting the argument that Regence, not IHC, was the 
party to address Maak's complaint. This simply is not true when the Court considers the 
party who was initiating aggressive collection efforts against Maak and the party to 
whom Maak's overpayment of $986.13 was made was IHC in both cases. Maak 
2
 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed. 1979) at 260 (defining coinsurance in property insurance context as "[a] 
relative division of risk between the insurer and the insured . . . taking effect only when the actual loss is partial and 
less than the amount of the policy; the insurer being liable to the extent of the policy for a loss equal to or in excess 
of that amount." Division of risk does not mean that IHC can agree with Regence to increase the risk (in this case, 
IHCs charges). 
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obviously has no complaint against Regence if it decides to pay more than its eighty 
percent (80%) portion of actual "total charges." If requiring that a patient pay some co-
insurance for medical treatment is important to Regence, then it should re-examine it 
conduct of paying more to the health-care provider than what is owed. In any event, 
Maak is required to pay something to someone after the hospital has been paid in full, as 
occurred here, she is required to pay Regence, not IHC. Yet it was IHC, not Regence, 
that unceasingly demanded the $986.13 after having received more from Regence than 
the $11,396.11 contained on the itemized statement of charges. It was IHC, not Regence, 
that pocketed this money. 
V, The Rule 56(f) Motion Should not Have Been Denied 
IHC has inserted multiple "feel-good" facts in the Memorandum Decision signed by 
the trial court below, and yet none of these "facts" has been the subject of proper 
discovery. The Memorandum Decision, for example, states that it rarely occurs that IHC 
receives overpayments in comparison to actual charges for actual services rendered, as 
occurred in Maak's case. Similarly, IHC states that Maak would have been required to 
pay the same co-payment amount if IHC would have measured from the $11,396.11 
charges. Those alleged facts cannot be known to be true without further discovery into 
the matter instead of relying on self-serving affidavits submitted by IHC. In any event, 
the different facts presented by what would be the case if Regence had paid IHC 
differently are not the facts of this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the ruling below and 
determine, as a matter of law, that once full payment has been made to a health-care 
provider, as measured against the statement of services issued by the provider, then no 
further obligation of any kind exists on the part of the patient. In ruling this way, the 
Court should reverse the summary judgment motion entered in favor of IHC and enter 
summary judgment on Maak's contract-based claims. The Court also then should allow 
Maak to pursue discovery on her deception-based claims against IHC. 
DATED this _£_ day of August 2006. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
James L. Ahlstrom 
Attorneys for Appellant Ann V. Maak 
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ADDENDUM 
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 1 2004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN V. MAAK, an individual, on 
behalf of herself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and JOHN DOES 
1-20, 
Defendants. 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation. 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN V. MAAK, an individual, and 
members of any class which may 
be certified under Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs, 
REGENCE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
Healthwise, a Utah corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 21 through 40, 
Third Party Defendants, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 03091.1.86S 
tw*/ 
MAAK V. IHC PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
On May 17, 2004, the defendant IHC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion, and the Motion of Third Party 
Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield to Compel Arbitration were all 
before the Court. The Court heard argument of counsel on all 
matters, and took the matter under advisement to review the 
arguments of counsel in connection with their previously submitted 
written documents. The Court has now had an opportunity to once 
again review the parties' written submissions, the oral arguments, 
the case law cited, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the 
following Minute Entry decision. 
As to the plaintiff's Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Motion, the Court is satisfied that there is no need to 
delay these proceedings to engage in further discovery, and 
accordingly plaintiff's Motion to allow further discovery before 
hearing the defendant IHC's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Turning to IHC's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court is 
satisfied that it is compelled to grant the Motion. The billing 
plaintiff received from IHC above and beyond that amount paid by 
her insurance carrier, Blue Cross Blue Shield, the third party 
defendant, was all in accordance with the agreement that IHC had 
with Blue Cross Blue Shield, and the plaintiff's agreement that she 
would remain responsible for all co-insurance amounts. Clearly, 
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her co-insurance obligation under her policy with Blue Cross Blue 
Shield was the 2 0% for which she is now being billed. 
While it is surely unusual for the hospital to be seeking 
payment above and beyond the amount that it billed, it is entitled 
to bill for the co-insurance amounts for which the plaintiff is 
responsible, even where that will result in an excess payment to 
the hospital. 
For the reasons outlined by defendant IHC in its papers 
supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment, together with the 
statements indicated herein, the Court is satisfied that IHC's 
Motion must be granted as to all of plaintiff's claims. 
Conversely, the Court is satisfied that it must deny the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The claims of the plaintiff that she now has to pay a co-
insurance amount, even where her insurance carrier has paid the 
hospital in excess of what the hospital believes is due for the 
services rendered to the plaintiff, is a situation that should be 
addressed between the plaintiff and her insurance carrier, not the 
plaintiff and the hospital. 
Based on the fact the Court has determined that defendant 
IHC's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted, the Motion for 
Arbitration is moot and the Court declines to address the same. 
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Counsel for defendant IHC is directed to prepare an 
appropriate Order granting Summary Judgment, setting forth the 
basis as required by Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and submit the same to the Court for review and 
signature. 
Dated this d \ day of June, 2004. 
I 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
&BEDNARLLC 
Steven C. Bednar, #5660 
Mary C. Gordon, #6880 
Third Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-5678 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
ANN V. MAAK, an individual, on behalf 
of herself and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 030911869 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
1 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANN V. MAAK, an individual, and members 
of any class which may be certified under 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
i 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Third Party Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
REGENCE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ) 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation; Health Wise, a ) 
Utah corporation; and JOHN DOES 21 through ) 
40, ) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
On May 17,2004 the Court heard oral argument on four motions: (1) Defendant IHC 
Health Services, Inc.fs ("IHC") Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiff Ann Maakfs 
("Plaintiffs) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (3) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion; and (4) 
Third Party Defendant Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah's ("Regence") Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. After hearing arguments on all matters and reviewing briefing on all motions, the 
Court entered a Minute Entry on June 21, 2004 and now enters this Memorandum Decision and 
Order. 
Facts 
On April 2-5,2002, Ann Maak ("Plaintiff') received emergency and surgical care 
inpatient treatment at LDS Hospital, which is operated by IHC. Upon her admission to LDS 
Hospital, Plaintiffs husband, Charles Maak, executed a Consent and Conditions of Admissions 
("Admission Conditions") on Plaintiffs behalf. In the Admission Conditions, Plaintiff agreed to 
"pay for all health care services rendered to [her] in the Facility" and acknowledged that she 
"remains responsible for all co-payments, deductibles, co-insurance, and/or non-covered services 
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regardless of amount paid by insurance or third party payor,11 When Plaintiff received the 
treatment, she was a family dependent under Regencefs Health Care Agreement for Utah Bar 
Members and Employees ("Plan"). The Plan dictates the payment practices and obligations of 
Regence and the payment obligations of Plaintiff for health care where Plaintiff seeks benefits 
under the Plan, such as in the treatment involved in this case. 
In order to provide medical services to its members under the Plan, Regence contracts 
with "Participating Providers," to "provide to Members Covered Services in accordance with the 
provisions of [the Plan]." Under the Plan, care rendered by "Participating Providers," such as 
LDS Hospital, is covered at a rate of 80% of the Eligible Medical Expenses. The Plan member is 
responsible for the remaining 20% of Eligible Medical Expenses as a coinsurance payment 
obligation, subject to an annual maximum. 
Regencefs provider agreement with LDS Hospital establishes a formula for determining 
the Eligible Medical Expenses allowed by Regence for inpatient care by reference to Diagnostic 
Related Groups ("DRGfs"). The flat fee DRG amount is used by Regence as the Eligible Medical 
Expense for inpatient procedures rather than the actual itemized statements of services, which the 
facility must provide in compliance with state law. In rare instances, this method of determining 
Eligible Medical Expenses can result in the Participating Provider receiving a dollar amount in 
excess of its itemized statement of services. The Plan specifically notifies members that its 
contractual payment schedules with Participating Providers "can be greater than or less than the 
facility's actual charges for Covered Services." Nevertheless, for purposes of determining the 
member's 20% coinsurance payment obligation, Regence uses the lesser of the contractual DRG 
flat fee amount or the facility's itemized statement of services. 
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In compliance with state law, IHC provided Plaintiff with an itemized statement of 
services for facility charges of $ 11,208.11. Pursuant to its DRG contractual payment schedule 
with LDS Hospital, Regence determined the Eligible Medical Expense to be $13,274.95. 
Pursuant to the cost-sharing provisions of the Plan, Regence determined its payment obligation to 
be $12,310.36 and Plaintiffs coinsurance obligation to be $964.59. Plaintiffs 20% coinsurance 
amount, which was reduced because Plaintiff surpassed the annual maximum, was determined by 
reference to IHCs itemized statement of services because that amount was less than the DRG flat 
fee amount. Thus, Plaintiffs coinsurance obligation was no greater than it would have been even 
if the DRG flat fee amount had been less than the itemized statement of services. 
Regence provided an explanation of benefits which advised LDS Hospital the exact 
amount of Plaintiff s coinsurance payment obligation under the Plan as determined by Regence. 
IHC then billed Plaintiff for her coinsurance amount consistent with the direction received from 
Regence. Plaintiff objected to the billing because it resulted in payments to IHC in excess of the 
itemized statement of services. Plaintiff exchanged several letters, through her husband, with 
LDS Hospital in which she protested the billing. Plaintiff ultimately paid the bill under protest 
and then filed this lawsuit in which she asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insurance fraud, common law fraud and deceptive trade 
practices. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Analysis 
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial and 
that IHC is entitled to judgment on all of Plaintiff s claims as a matter of law. In granting IHCs 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978). 
The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that the existence of her insurance coverage has no 
affect on her payment obligations to IHC. Plaintiff had two ways to pay for the subject charges: 
(1) not utilizing her insurance and paying $11,208.11 entirely out of her own pocket; or (2) using 
her insurance and satisfying the $964.50 coinsurance payment obligation prescribed by the Plan. 
When Plaintiff chose to utilize her insurance to pay IHC, both the Plan between Plaintiff and 
Regence and the provider agreement between Regence and IHC became applicable. The Court is 
satisfied that the bill Plaintiff received from IHC, which bill amount was determined by Regence 
pursuant to the Plan, conforms to the coinsurance payment obligations accepted by Plaintiff 
under the Plan. Furthermore, the Plaintiff specifically agreed in the Admission Conditions that 
she would remain responsible for her co-insurance and co-payment obligations "regardless of 
amount paid by insurance or third party payor." Thus, the Plaintiff cannot claim that the 
Admission Conditions in any way excused her from the terms of her co-insurance 
responsibilities. Having received the benefit of her insurance, she cannot now refuse to meet her 
coinsurance payment obligation. 
The Court also recognizes that Plaintiff did not have to pay any additional money as a 
result of the fact that the contractual DRG reimbursement amount determined by Regence 
exceeded IHCs itemized statement of services because the Plaintiffs coinsurance obligation was 
determined by reference to the lesser amount on the itemized statement of services. The 
Plaintiff, therefore, complains not that she had to pay too much under the Regence Plan, but that 
IHC received too much. Yet Plaintiff was made aware of this exact possibility in her Plan — a 
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possibility which Plaintiff accepted so that she could receive the benefit of paying substantially 
less than the itemized charges. If the Plaintiff finds the terms of her contract with Regence or the 
terms of Regence's contract with Participating Providers unacceptable, it is a complaint that must 
be addressed between the Plaintiff and her insurance carrier, not the Plaintiff and IHC. Plaintiffs 
claims for breach of contract and for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fail. 
Plaintiffs claim of insurance fraud fails because Regence, the insurance provider, 
determined the amount it paid to IHC and because Plaintiffs co-insurance obligation was 
calculated in accordance with the Plan. To state a claim under the Utah Insurance Fraud Act, 
Plaintiff must demonstrate that IHC acted with an "intent to deceive." UCA § 31A-31-103(2). 
An intent to deceive on the part of IHC is inconsistent with the fact that Regence determined the 
amount to be paid for the services and the accurate billing statement and explanations of the 
charges given to Plaintiff. Neither is there any evidence that the charges were substantially in 
excess of customary charges, as required by UCA 31A-31-10. Indeed, the DRG's are 
calculations of customary charges that Regence uses to reimburse the Hospital and cannot be 
deemed to be either fraudulent or in excess of customary charges when they are agreed upon 
appropriate charges. 
Plaintiffs claim of common law fraud and misrepresentation fails to satisfy several 
essential elements. To succeed in a common law fraud claim, nine elements must be established: 
(1) representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) and 
known by representor to be false; (5) for purpose of inducing action by other; (6) that the other 
party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely on; (8) thereby inducing 
him to act; (9) to his injury. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002). 
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In this case, there was no misrepresentation of a presently existing fact, as all the charges, 
debits and credits were accurately shown on the billing statement Plaintiff received. 
Additionally, IHC could not have known its billing to be false when it conformed with Regence's 
determinations of what could be collected. Finally, Plaintiff did not act in ignorance of falsity, as 
the record shows that she spent substantial time debating the merits of the charges in 
correspondence. Her eventual submission of payment was under protest, which is inconsistent 
with a claim that she was deceived into paying the bill. 
Plaintiffs claim of deceptive trade practices must be denied because the Truth in 
Advertising Act is not applicable to the facts of this case. The purpose of the statute Plaintiff 
cites is to "prevent deceptive, misleading and false advertising practices and forms in Utah." 
UCA 13-1 la-1. In relation to the statute, "Advertisement" is defined as a written or oral 
representation made "in connection with the solicitation of business." UCA 13-1 la-2. This case 
does not touch on business solicitations or false advertising making UCA 13-1 la-3 inapplicable. 
Beyond the statute being inapplicable, Plaintiff, as noted above, has also failed to establish that 
the billing was qualified as deceptive. 
For the reasons detailed above, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment must be denied. The Court also denies Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion 
to extend discovery. Plaintiff has not identified any specific discovery necessary to further rebut 
IHCs arguments on its Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court finds it unnecessary to 
delay the proceedings to engage in further discovery as the facts which control disposition of 
IHCs Summary Judgment Motion are before the Court. 
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Finally, because there are no claims remaining in this action against IHC, IHCs Third-
Party Complaint against Regence may also be dismissed. Regence's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration is therefore dismissed as moot and the Court declines to address the same. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. IHCs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. All claims and causes 
of action of Plaintiff against IHC are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and on the merits. 
2. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion is hereby DENIED. 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
4. Regence's Third Party Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby DISMISSED as moot. 
5. IHCs counterclaims against Plaintiff are hereby E J^SMISSED as moot. 
SO ORDERED this fj_ day of/% 2004: / 
f IMOTH^^__ c n 
)ISTRICT COTflmUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER to be sent, via U.S. Mail, t h i s ^ ^ day of July, 2004, to the 
following: 
Terry E. Welch 
James L. Ahlstrom 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Timothy C. Houpt 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C 
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Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-20 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2006 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2006 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION. * * * 
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2006 UT 27 (5/4/2006); 2006 UT APP 180 
(5/4/2006) AND MAY 17, 2006 (FEDERAL CASES). * * * 
TITLE 26. UTAH HEALTH CODE 
CHAPTER 2 1 . HEALTH CARE FACILITY LICENSING AND INSPECTION ACT 
• GO TO COPE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-20 (2006) 
§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of itemized charges to patients 
(1) Each hospital, as defined in Section 26-21-2, shall provide a statement of itemized 
charges to any patient receiving medical care or other services from that hospital. 
(2) The statement shall be provided to the patient or his personal representative or agent at 
the hospital's expense, personally, by mail, or by verifiable electronic delivery at the time any 
statement is provided to any person or entity for billing purposes. I f the statement is not 
provided to a third party, it shall be provided to the patient as soon as possible and 
practicable. 
(3) The statement shall itemize each of the charges actually provided by the hospital to the 
patient. 
(4) The statement may not include charges of physicians who bill separately. 
(5) The requirements of this section do not apply to patients who receive services from a 
hospital under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 
(6) A statement of charges to be paid by a third party and related information provided to a 
patient pursuant to this section shall be marked in bold: "DUPLICATE: DO NOT PAY" or other 
appropriate language. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 26-21-20, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 196, § 2; 1990, ch. 114, § 20; 1997, 
ch. 209, § 12; 2000, ch. 86, § 28. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "Section 
26-21-2" for "Subsections 26-21-2(8) and (18)" in Subsection (1). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added "or by verifiable electronic delivery" 
and made stylistic changes in Subsection (2). 
